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The main objective of this paper was to analyze the impact of the Sudanese government agricultural 
policies on cotton and wheat production in the Gezira Scheme in the seasons 2003-2007 in terms of 
efficiency, competitiveness and comparative advantages. The study depended on data and information 
collected from different sources. The policy analysis matrix (PAM) was adopted as an analytical model 
to achieve the above objective. Nominal protection coefficient of outputs, nominal protection 
coefficient of inputs, effective protection coefficient, profitability coefficie-nt, domestic resources 
coefficient and international value added were calculated for the seasons under consideration and 
compared with those obtained by Adam (1996). The results showed that the government policies 
discouraged Gezira tenants to produce cotton and its outputs had been subjected to taxes throughout all 
seasons under consideration, where on the other hand, the government policies provided incentives and 
favored production of wheat in the Gezira Scheme. Consequently it could be concluded that, although 
the overall  impact  of the government polices was tending to be worse regarding the protection and 
competitiveness, but still there were comparative advantages in cotton and wheat production. For 
providing more incentives for food and cash crops, the study recommended that the Sudanese 
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Most tenancies in the Gezira Scheme have become unable to provide an income above the poverty 
line for an average farmer family in the Gezira. As a result, the Gezira Scheme has become uneconomic 
from the national as well as from the farmer’s viewpoint (Eldaw, 2004). 
   Attempts to reform agricultural schemes started since the mid-sixties (Elnagarabi, 1996). However, 
the most significant policy change that has considerable impact on irrigated agriculture is the 
replacement of the joint account system (JAS) by the individual account system (IAS) in 1980. The 
idea was to change the role of the government from a partnership in costs and revenues with tenants to 
that of renting land and selling water to them. It was argued that the IAS gave the tenants incentives to 
increase productivity and hence increase their income (World Bank, 1986).   
   The Sudanese government adopted the structural adjustment programs for agriculture (SAPA) since 
1992, Gezira Scheme was not an exception; the main specific elements of which were: 
1. Reduction of export taxes for agricultural exports to 5% for all exports except cotton and gum Arabic, 
for which export tax was reduced to 10 %. 
2. Removing subsidies on inputs, most important of which are fertilizers, insecticides, land and water. 
3. Reducing subsidies on food products prices  
4. Lifting price controls and regulations imposed by the government on agricultural commodities; with 
the exception of wheat, where government intervention was maintained by determining minimum 
procurement prices. 
5. Abolishing the monopoly of public marketing companies.  
6. Shifting from public to private finance, provision of credits to agriculture at unsubsidized gross 
margin rate and adoption of Islamic modes of lending.  
7. Privatizing of agricultural engineering, Gezira light railway, ginneries, irrigation, agricultural 
administration and the civil engineering department into independent companies. 
8. Recently, and due to the situation of low productivity and the government desire to apply its 
privatization program and stop supporting irrigated agriculture, it launched the Gezira Scheme Act in 
2005.  
   The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the government policies on cotton and 
wheat production in the Gezira Scheme. The specific objectives were to estimate the protection, 
competitiveness and advantage indicators of cotton and wheat.  
 
 
RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
 
   The data used in the study were obtained from different institutional sources, published and 
unpublished materials in Gezira Scheme, Sudan Cotton Company, Bank of Sudan, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning and the General Administration of Customs (seasons 2003-2007). 
   The policy analysis matrix (PAM) had been used to measure nominal protection coefficient of 
outputs (NPCO), nominal protection coefficient of inputs (NPCI) effective protection coefficient 
(EPC), domestic resources coefficient (DRC), international value added (IVA) and profitability 
coefficient (PC). The PAM parameters would be used to assess the international competitiveness, 
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protection measures and comparative advantages of the Gezira Scheme products, mainly cotton and 
wheat. 
The policy analysis matrix (PAM) 
   The policy analysis matrix method has been used as one of the modern tools to analyze the 
agricultural policies to derive some indicators and standards for measuring the impact of the 
government agricultural policies on the agricultural sector (Table 1). It has been initiated to analyze 
market distortions and policy interventions in terms of their effects on the vertical commodity system 
from its initial production in the farm through the primary procurement, processing and marketing 
stages (Pearson and Monk, 1989). 
 
Table 1. The policy analysis matrix (PAM) structure. 
 Revenues Costs Profit 
  Tradable inputs Domestic factors  
Private prices A B C D 
Social prices E F G H 
Divergences I J K L 
Source: Pearson and Monk (1989). 
Where: 
A = total revenue in private price (market prevailing price). 
B = cost of tradable inputs in private price. 
C = cost of domestic factors in private price. 
D = private profit. 
E = total revenue in social price (efficiency price). 
F = cost of tradable inputs in social prices. 
G = cost of domestic factors in social prices. 
H = social profits. 
The matrix is thus made up of the following identities 
Private or financial profit  (D)    D=A-B-C 
Social profit                     (H)    H=E-F-G 
International value added (IVA) E-F=H+G 
Output transfers               (I)      I=A-E 
Input transfers                  (J)      J=B-F 
Factors transfers              (K)    K=C-G 
Net transfers                    (L)    L=D-H=I-J-K 
   The shadow exchange rate (SER) is the economic price of foreign currency. There is a common 
misconception that if the market for foreign exchange is a free float, the shadow exchange rate (SER) 
is equal to the market exchange rate. That would be the case only if there were no taxes and subsidies 
on the demand and supply of tradable goods, if all commodities and factors were priced at their 
economic value, and if the current account deficit was sustainable. In all cases, the SER will diverge 
from the market or official exchange rate (OER).   
   This method of shadow pricing is tedious and time consuming and consequently rarely followed. 
Instead, non-traded goods are generally valued at economic prices by the use of conversion factors. A 
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conversion factor is a short-cut method for converting prices of non- traded goods and services into 
border prices. At the most aggregated level, a single conversion factor, the standard conversion factor 
(SCF) is used for this purpose. The SCF is derived by taking the ratio of all exports and imports at 
border prices to their value at domestic prices. Shadow prices of non-traded items are then obtained by 
multiplying the (SCF) with the market prices. This reduces the market prices to their real economic 
value. The formula for the SCF is: 
    SCF =             M + X                   ……………………………………  (1) 
                          (M + D) + (X - T) 
Where: 
     M = value of imports at border prices 
     X = value of exports at border prices 
     D = total import duties 
     T = total export taxes 
   Based on the collected data, the estimated conversion factor used was 0.94 (Alhag, 2009). 
Nominal protection coefficient of outputs (NPCO) 
   It measures protection and can be calculated by the following formula:  
NPCO = A/E……………………………………………………………   (2) 
Protection coefficient of nominal inputs (NPCI) 
   It measures the actual divergences or distortions between the domestic prices of tradable inputs and 
its boarder or world price. It was obtained by dividing the tradable inputs value in private prices (B) by 
its value in social prices (F) 
NPCI = B/F…………………………………………….……….    (3)                                                                                          
Effective protection coefficient (EPC) 
   It is a comparison between the value-added measured in private prices (A-B) by the value added 
measured in social prices (E-F), and it is a more efficient measure of the policy effect, so it is assessing 
the pure impact of the policies on each of the inputs and outputs and it could be measured as  
EPC =A-B/E-F………………………………………………… .  (4)                                                                                       
Domestic resources coefficient (DRC) 
   Also called social cost-benefit ratio and it is used to measure the domestic production efficiency 
relatively to the world markets. In other words, it measures the economic efficiency or the comparative 
advantages in the international exchange average and it clarifies the fact that if the social costs and 
profits to produce a commodity is better than to export it. Also, it compares the social cost of using the 
domestic factors (G) to the production value added in social prices (E-F), i.e. it measures social domestic 
resources cost ratio and the comprehensive efficiency of the commodity system as follows: 
DRC =G/E-F…………………………………………………….    (5) 
International value added (IVA) 
   The IVA is defined as the revenue of the crop minus the imported (tradable) inputs expressed in 
foreign currency. It is equal to (A-B) in financial analysis and (E-F) in economic analysis. It is an 
absolute measure of competitiveness. A crop with a positive IVA indicates positive foreign exchange 
earnings or savings. The principal defect of such a measure is that it neglects the effect of domestic 
factors. 
IVA= E-F…………………………………………………………  (6) 
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Profitability coefficient (PC) 
   Profitability coefficient is a measure of absolute competitiveness and the incentives of commodity. It 
is calculated as the ratio of private profitability to social one. 
PC=PP/EP=D/H…………………………………………………    (7) 
PP = private profitability. 
EP = economic profitability. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
   The policy analysis was employed to calculate the following: 
1. The nominal protection coefficient of outputs 
   The value of nominal protection coefficient of output (NPCO) for cotton in all seasons was less than one which 
means that cotton output has been taxed, and the government was not protecting cotton production (Table 2). 
Nominal protection coefficient of outputs (NPCO) for wheat was greater than one, indicating that wheat output 
had been subsidized (10 SDG per sack) and the government was protecting wheat production. Adam (1996) 
revealed that cotton was heavily taxed, however, discrimination against cotton appeared to be substantial during 
the first three years of the program. In the seasons from 2003 to 2007, the discrimination against cotton was still 
existing despite the slight improvement from an average of 0.28 in the beginning of the liberalization program 
to 0.77 in the seasons of this study (Table 2). As known earlier, the government reduced export taxes to 5% 
for all agricultural exports except cotton and gum Arabic, for which export tax was reduced to 10%. 
According to Albashir (2005), the percentage of taxes and fees on cotton were: 
The federal government: 16.5% 
Gezira State and social services: 7.8% 
(Zakat after subtracting the production cost: 5%) 
   On the other hand, positive results were achieved in wheat protection that appeared in the increase of 
NPCO from less than one at an average of 0.30 in the seasons from 1991 to 1993 to an average of 1.09 
in the years of the study (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Nominal protection coefficient of outputs (NPCO) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme, 
seasons (2003/04–2006/07). 
Season Cotton Wheat 
2003/04 0.75 1.09 
2004/05 0.73 1.08 
2005/06 0.79 1.08 
2006/07 0.80                 1.10 
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Table 3. Nominal protection coefficient of outputs (NPCO) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme 
(seasons 1991/92–1992/93). 
Wheat Cotton Season 
0.45 0.24 1991/92 
0.14 0.31 1992/93 
Source: Adam (1996). 
 
2. The nominal protection coefficient of inputs 
   The value of nominal protection coefficient of input (NPCI) for cotton and wheat in all seasons under 
consideration were greater than one which means that both crops inputs had been taxed (Tables 4 and 
5).  
 
Table 4. Nominal protection coefficient of inputs (NPCI) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme 
(seasons 2003/04–2006/07). 
Season Cotton Wheat 
2003/04 1.06 1.06 
2004/05 1.06 1.06 
2005/06 1.06 1.06 
2006/07 1.06 1.06 
Source: Alhag (2009).  
Table 5. Nominal protection coefficient of inputs (NPCI) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme 
(seasons 1991-93). 
Wheat Cotton Season 
0.38 0.77 1991/92 
0.62 0.50 1992/93 
Source: Adam (1996).                       
   In the beginning of the liberalization program, results implied support to farmers through inputs 
subsidies by the government as shown in Table 5 for both products, whereas in the seasons under 
consideration, cotton and wheat suffered from high taxation.   
 3. The effective protection coefficient (EPC) 
   For cotton, seasons (2003 – 2007), EPC was less than one (Table 6). This means that the adopted 
policy was discriminating against cotton producers and indicated that the production of cotton was not 
protected through the policy intervention. For wheat, the value of EPC was greater than one (subsidized) 
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Table 6. Effective protection coefficient (EPC) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme (seasons 
2003/04–2006/07). 
Season Cotton Wheat 
2003/04 0.58 1.09 
2004/05 0.58 1.08 
2005/06 0.66 1.08 
2006/007 0.53 1.11 
Source: Alhag (2009).  
4. Domestic resources coefficient (DRC) 
   The results obtained showed that the values of DRC for all seasons under the study for both products 
were less than one (Tables 7 and 8). This indicates that the Gezira Scheme has a comparative advantage 
in producing both cotton and wheat and the use of the domestic factors is socially profitable. When 
comparing these results to those reported by Adam (1996), it is clear that the comparative advantage of 
cotton is deteriorating (Tables 7 and 8). 
 
Table 7. Domestic resources coefficient (DRC) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme (2003/04–
2006/07). 
Season Cotton Wheat 
2003/2004 0.37 0.33 
2004/2005 0.33 0.30 
2005/2006 0.30 0.37 
2006/2007 0.54 0.24 
Source: Alhag (2009).  
 
Table 8. Domestic resources coefficient (DRC) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme seasons 
(1991/92–1992/93). 
Wheat Cotton Season 
0.36 0.19 1991/92 
0.16 0.26 1992/93 
Source: Adam (1996). 
 
   The comparison indicated that both crops were profitable and competitive, but the difference between 
the lowest ratio (0.19) in the first season (1991/1992) and the last season (2006/2007) (0.54) indicated 
a trend of increase in the value of the DRC throughout the years. This was a bad sign which showed 
that the situation tended to get worse in the comparative advantage of cotton. 
 
5. The international value added (IVA) 
   It is defined as the revenue of the traded crop minus the imported tradable inputs expressed in 
foreign currency. A crop with a positive IVA indicated that it is a net earner of foreign exchange. It 
measures the international competitiveness of the product and is an absolute measure of competitive-
ness. The results showed positive values of IVA for both products in all seasons analyzed (Tables 9 and 
10). These results showed that the production of these products in the Gezira Scheme was competitive 
and it provided positive foreign exchange earnings, particularly for wheat in the season 2006/2007 as 
compared to the previous seasons.  The results showed positive values of IVA for both crops in both 
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periods. These results meant that cotton and wheat production in the Gezira Scheme were competitive 
and provided positive earnings from cotton export and local sale of wheat. However, it appeared that 
the adopted policies had been in favor of wheat (food crop) which clearly appeared in the season 
2006/07 as shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Table 9. International value added (IVA) for cotton and wheat  
in the Gezira Scheme (seasons 2003/04–2006/07). 
Season Cotton (SD/feddan)   Wheat (SD/feddan) 
2003/04        263          205 
2004/05        322          257.1 
2005/06        343          236.4 
2006/07        215.4          423 
Source: Alhag (2009).  
 
Table 10. International value added (IVA) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme (seasons 
1991/92–1992/93). 
Wheat (SD/feddan)   Cotton (SD/feddan)   Season        
133.27 296.4 1991/92 
163.96 291.5 1992/93 
Source: Adam (1996). 
 
6. The profitability coefficient (PC) 
   Results obtained for PC indicated that all ratios for cotton were less than one which confirmed that 
the government discouraged farmers to produce cotton and indicated that they would only receive 
approximately half of the profit that they would receive in the absence of government policy and that 
was clearly noticed in the season 2006/07 (Table 11). The ratio for wheat was greater than one in all 
seasons so that the government provided incentives and favored the production of wheat and the farmer 
was receiving 0.2% additional profits in all seasons except in the season 2004/05 which was 0.1% as a 
result of government policy (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Profitability coefficient (PC) for cotton and wheat in the Gezira Scheme (2003/04–2006/07). 
Season Cotton Wheat 
2003/04 0.37 1.19 
2004/05 0.39 1.15 
2005/06 0.59 1.19 
2006/07 0.01 1.2 
Source: Alhag (2009).  
Conclusions and policy implications 
   The study was carried out to analyze the impact of the agricultural specific policies adopted by the 
Sudanese government on the protection, comparative advantage and competitiveness on cotton and 
wheat production in the Gezira Scheme for the period 2003-07. Results obtained indicated that these 
policies imposed implicit taxes on cotton and wheat inputs over the years of the study, provided 
incentives for wheat production, discouraged cotton production and there were still comparative 
advantages in cotton and wheat production in the Gezira Scheme. The policy implications of the 
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protection, comparative advantages and competitiveness indicators are that these policies have failed 
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 تحليل تأثير السياسات الحكومية على إنتاج القطن والقمح 
 )2003-2003في مشروع الجزيرة(
 
 3و عباس السر محمد الامين 2، محمد صديق محمد الحاج1السيد السر مصطفى النقرابى
 قسم الاقتصاد الزراعي، كلية العلوم الزراعية، جامعة الجزيرة، واد مدني، السودان. 1
 ولاية الجزيرة، واد مدني، السودان. وزارة الزراعة،  2 




إن الهدف الأساسي لهذه الدراسة هو تحليل تأثير السياسات الزراعية التي اتبعتها الحكومة السودانية على إنتاج   
بالحماية والتنافسية والميزة النسبية.  فيما يختص 2002-3002القطن والقمح في مشروع الجزيرة خلال المواسم 
اعتمدت الدراسة على البيانات والمعلومات الثانوية التي تم جمعها من مصادرها  الأولية والثانوية التقليدية 
والالكترونية. تم استخدام مصفوفة تحليل السياسة وهى إحدى أدوات التحليل الكمي لتحقيق هدف الدراسة حيث 
ليل السياسة وهى معامل الحماية الاسمية للمنتجات، معامل الحماية الاسمية للمخرجات، حسبت أهم مؤشرات تح
معامل الحماية الفعال، معامل حماية الموارد المحلية، القيمة المضافة، ومعامل الربحية ثم قورنت نتائج الدراسة مع 
لحكومية لا تشجع  مزارعي مشروع الجزيرة خلصت الدراسة إلي أن السياسات ا .)1991ما توصلت إليه دراسة ادم (
على إنتاج  القطن وان مخرجاته ظلت تعانى من فرض الضرائب طوال مواسم الدراسة بينما  تقدم تلك السياسات 
مجموعة من الحوافز التي تشجع على إنتاج محصول القمح بالمشروع كما أن مدخلات المحصولين مازالت تعانى 
 رغم ذلك ما زالت هنالك ميزة نسبية لإنتاج القطن والقمح في مشروع الجزيرة.من فرض ضرائب باهظة ولكن 
  
 
 
